The Liberal Baby Bust

Are liberals breeding themselves out of the genepool? A report by Philip Longman in USA Today suggests that the liberal/progressive lifestyle is resulting in far fewer children per couple than you'll find in conservative households, and that doesn't bode well for the long-term viability of liberals and their political views (not that there's anything wrong with that):

What's the difference between Seattle and Salt Lake City? There are many differences, of course, but here's one you might not know. In Seattle, there are nearly 45% more dogs than children. In Salt Lake City, there are nearly 19% more kids than dogs.

This curious fact might at first seem trivial, but it reflects a much broader and little-noticed demographic trend that has deep implications for the future of global culture and politics. It's not that people in a progressive city such as Seattle are so much fonder of dogs than are people in a conservative city such as Salt Lake City. It's that progressives are so much less likely to have children.

It's a pattern found throughout the world, and it augers a far more conservative future — one in which patriarchy and other traditional values make a comeback, if only by default. Childlessness and small families are increasingly the norm today among progressive secularists. As a consequence, an increasing share of all children born into the world are descended from a share of the population whose conservative values have led them to raise large families.

What's interesting about this article is that the author, while discussing declining birth rates among liberals, never mentions the impact of abortion. James Taranto of OpinionJournal.com's Best of the Web Today has often discussed his theory that he calls "The Roe Effect" and how abortion is removing people from the future who would be more likely to follow in their parent's liberal views. Meanwhile conservatives, who are much more likely to oppose abortion, continue to have kids and those kids are most likely to take on the conservative views of their parents. Of course some kids of conservatives will rebel and reject their parent's politics, but there will be fewer of their fellow libs running around.

The author summarizes it this way:

Tomorrow's children, therefore, unlike members of the postwar baby boom generation, will be for the most part descendants of a comparatively narrow and culturally conservative segment of society. To be sure, some members of the rising generation may reject their parents' values, as often happens. But when they look for fellow secularists with whom to make common cause, they will find that most of their would-be fellow travelers were quite literally never born.

The author also never uses the word "selfish" when he describes the liberal lifestyle, but given how much you must give of yourself in order to raise kids, the decision not to raise children could also partly be credited to a self-indulgent lifestyle that's more concerned with personal freedom and pleasure than anything else.